The Economic Times
April 14, 2022
India has done well to not just stand its ground but also explain why it stands this ground, on its policy regarding Russia's war in Ukraine in Tuesday's India-US 2+2 ministerial meet. It has rightly ignored some voices from Washington like US Congressman Ro Khanna and US Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh. On its part, the Joe Biden administration seems to realise that pushing New Delhi to the '(selective) sanction Russia' club is not viable.
Washington had always missed the point that a mature policy would support India to pursue its genuine national interests. India has done well to drive home this point this time around. Narendra Modi and S Jaishankar have nuanced India's stance and held steady, underlining the fact that India's context vis-a-vis Russia is different from that of the US and Europe, especially with a belligerent China in its immediate neighbourhood and borders.
Even as New Delhi walks the line, it is time for India to buy as much oil as it needs from Russia. No justification on the lines of 'If Europe can buy, India also can' is required. Putting in place a rupee-rouble trade mechanism is not difficult to implement. And diplomacy can ensure that this is not seen by the Western powers as a geopolitical zero-sum game.
Even beyond Russian oil - which, as Jaishankar pointed out in Washington pithily, India purchases an amount in a month that is probably 'less than what Europe does in an afternoon' - there are many things that Russia can offer that other nations have been unwilling to, with the US, ironically, topping the list of 'no sales'. Most importantly, Moscow can - despite the scale-down of India's dependence on arms and weapons systems from Russia - support India to build an indigenous military-industrial complex. There is no reason why countries like the US and Israel as well as Russia should not provide defence shopping options for India if New Delhi continues its current position of 'neutrality' in the Ukraine war.
The rationale of keeping 'lines open' with Russia is not based on some woolly nostalgia for 'Hindi-Russi bhai-bhai' of the Soviet era. It should be - as GoI has been showing - based on hard-nosed foreign policy that rejects 'campism' because it can. New Delhi is under no compulsion to stray from its current 'neutral' stand unless things change drastically. It should be noted that Modi in his talks with Biden on Tuesday prior to the 2+2 ministerial dialogue brought up with concern the humanitarian damages wrought by Russia on Ukraine's populace. This shows that it is not dogma but crafted policy that is guiding India's position in and outside the United Nations.
In fact, India Inc can present a model for GoI to adhere to when dealing with strategic acquisitions that has been so far ignored. When Ratan Tata was negotiating the purchase of Britain's Jaguar Land Rover (JLR), not many thought it to be a wise decision. But he was convinced and confident that it would serve as the conduit for much-needed technology transfer for Tata cars in India. The strategy proved to be a resounding success. For Harrier, the SUV based on JLR architecture, for instance, there is today a waiting period of four months.
The Western sanctions on Russia will cut deep and for long, both on Russia and the globalised world at large. But Russia will be cashstrapped to fund large-scale R&D and undertake meaningful defence modernisation. India can achieve economies of scale by co-producing platforms in India with Russian technology and engineers. Many critical components that may be under sanctions can be purchased by Indian companies (computer chips, for instance).
Private sector companies should be invited and allowed to pursue projects prioritised by the defence ministry. These companies can be part-financed - as the US federal government does for the development of platforms. It would be a win-win situation for both India and Russia.
So far, barring the strategic 2008 US-India civil nuclear deal, the US-India defence relationship has primarily been that of a buyer and seller. If Washington is willing to change it and break into a tango with India, let it sign with New Delhi an all-enabling agreement similar to the 1958 US- Britain Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence. Because it takes both parties to do the dance.
